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Introduction 
“Science investigations begin with a question.” This sentence appears in the Next 
Generation Science Standards (NGSS) as an “Understanding of the Nature of Science” at 
the Kindergarten-Grade 2 level (NGSS Lead States, 2013), and sure enough, this was 
how most investigations began in my classroom during my years as an elementary school 
science teacher.  Some questions were more notable than others, but few were as 
memorable as the line of inquiry that began one morning as I sat on the carpet with a 
class of first graders, when a conversation about states of matter suddenly turned 
existential. One student interrupted my review of solids, liquids, and gases to inquire 
about why matter existed in the first place. Her classmates perked up, and soon others 
were joining in with questions about when the first matter came into being and whether 
someone or something was responsible for creating it. Before my eyes, the carpet full of 
six-year-olds had erupted into a full-scale debate about the nature of the universe. 
The NGSS also state that “Science is a unique way of knowing, and there are 
other ways of knowing.” Although this standard is intended for high school students, I felt 
it was critical, in this moment of organic curiosity, to share the sentiment with my first 
graders. From the origins of matter and the evolution of life to the risks of global climate 
change and the exploration of deep space, it is no exaggeration to state that some of 
humanity’s most pressing issues sit at the intersection of science, philosophy, ethics, and 
faith. I wanted my students to know that the questions they were asking were complex, 
enormous, and important, and that it would likely take more than science alone to answer 
them. 
I was fortunate to teach in a unique independent school where students were 
empowered to ask questions and teachers were granted the flexibility to deviate from the 
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planned curriculum. Childhood curiosity, however, is far from unique; in classrooms 
everywhere, students are likely pondering questions that sit outside the traditional bounds 
of science, whether they express them or not. These questions, if asked, may reveal 
valuable information about a student’s current understanding of a particular concept or of 
their broader understanding of the nature of science – information that might lead a 
teacher to revisit a lesson or reframe a concept to build on the learner’s prior knowledge. 
Yet, in many classrooms, these conversations do not happen. A teacher may be unsure of 
how to answer, or may fear the consequences of acknowledging concepts that delve into 
spiritual or religious territory; in other situations, the classroom climate may be such that 
questions simply linger in students’ minds, unasked.  
My own experiences as a teacher led me to wonder what could be gleaned from 
existing research to inform thoughtful pedagogy that takes into consideration children’s 
early conceptions about science and its relationship to other ways of knowing. I was 
particularly interested in children’s ideas about the relationship between science and 
religion, as this is likely a largely unexplored topic in most public school classrooms 
despite the fact that it is a present (and often significant) feature of many students’ lives 
outside of school. To explore these ideas, I have conducted a review of the research, 
asking the following guiding questions of the literature: 
1. What does the extant research suggest are the cognitive, developmental, and 
sociocultural factors that shape how young learners develop conceptions of science and 
its relationship to religion? 
2. What are the potential implications for exposing children to instruction that addresses 
the relationship between science and religion? 
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Methods and Organization of Paper 
In conducting this review, I have used academic databases including Academic 
Search Premier, ERIC, Google Scholar, and PsycINFO to seek out relevant research. I 
also used a snowballing technique to gather additional references. Given my interest in 
younger learners, I primarily limited my search to studies that focused on children ages 
12 and under, though I occasionally incorporated research on older learners to inform my 
understanding in areas where the literature on young learners was scarce, particularly 
with regards to research on students’ engagement with school science. It is also important 
to note that the literature on science and religion in schools is primarily an exploration of 
American Christian contexts (Hanley, Bennett, & Ratcliffe, 2014). As such, this paper is 
largely a review of studies conducted in the United States, many of which used language 
that explicitly or implicitly invoked Christian or Judeo-Christian conceptions of religion. 
The paper does include occasional references to European research, especially because 
some of the studies reviewed took a comparative approach with samples from the United 
States and other countries. 
I rely on working definitions offered by Sinatra and Nadelson (2011) to 
characterize the domains of science and religion for the purposes of this paper. Religion 
is considered to be “a set of commonly held beliefs and practices often codified through 
specific religious doctrine or religious law” (Sinatra & Nadelson, 2011, p. 176). This 
generic sort of definition is how the term “religion” is typically discussed in the education 
policy sphere (given the global nature of the language in the establishment clause of First 
Amendment), making it appropriate for the context of this paper. For the term science, 
Sinatra and Nadelson cite the definition used by the National Academy of Sciences: “the 
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use of evidence to construct testable explanations and predictions of natural phenomena, 
as well as the knowledge generated through this process” (National Academy of 
Sciences, 2008, p. 10). Additionally, when I use the term instruction, I am referring 
primarily to formal school learning settings, which are distinguished from informal 
learning contexts in important ways as I discuss sources of information and the 
familiarity and cultural relevance of particular explanatory frameworks.   
To begin this paper, I will provide a brief overview of how the relationship 
between science and religion has been framed theoretically in the literature, and introduce 
the connection I seek to make between this conceptual framing and the implications for 
education. I will then unpack three bodies of literature that can inform our understanding 
of how learners – especially young learners – make sense of potentially conflicting 
explanatory frameworks from the domains of science and religion: 
 The literature on testimony provides insight into how children learn about 
scientific and religious phenomena that they cannot perceive firsthand, and 
explores the cognitive process of grappling with counterintuitive and often 
conflicting explanatory framework offered by various sources. 
 The literature on epistemological reasoning examines how learners think how 
knowledge is conceptualized in different ways of knowing (in this case, 
science and religion), and suggests that being able to reason about 
epistemology is necessary for making sense of scientific and religious 
explanations. 
 The bodies of literature on situated cognition and collateral learning posit that 
the experience of actively grappling with conflicting testimony is emotionally 
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charged and connected to issues of culture and identity, thus implying that a 
“cold” model of conceptual change (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993).that does 
not account for affect and social context is insufficient for understanding the 
learning process  
After reviewing the literature in these three areas, I will turn to the science 
education literature to consider the implications for classroom culture and pedagogy, 
where I will argue that the reviewed research supports the practice of making room for 
ideas that sit outside the traditional bounds of science as a powerful pedagogical tool. 
Specifically, I will posit that students’ questions and ideas about concepts that fall outside 
these typical domain boundaries can be leveraged by science teachers for deeper 
understanding – not just about the intended scientific content goals, but also about 
concepts such as disciplinarity and perspective taking – and for a more inclusive 
classroom environment that invites all students to engage in scientific thinking, 
regardless of their cultural or religious backgrounds.  
Overview of Conceptual Background 
There is a rich body of theoretical literature focused on the relationship between 
science and religion as epistemologies (e.g., Barbour, 1966; Coleman, 2014; Gould, 
1999; Wilson, 1998). One of the most commonly cited frameworks comes from Ian 
Barbour, who posited four models of the relationship between science and religion: 
conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration (Barbour, 1988). In contemporary 
American rhetoric, conflict seems to be the most regularly evoked model. There is a 
common assumption embedded in much of our popular discourse that religious beliefs 
inhibit understandings of, and positive attitudes towards, science (Evans & Evans, 2008; 
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Gauchat, 2015). These ideas are regularly reflected in the results of public opinion polls 
that inquire about Americans’ views on science and religion, though some of these polls 
also begin to hint at the complexity of individuals’ real beliefs. For instance, a Pew 
Forum survey (Pew Forum, 2009) found that while 55% of participants responded 
affirmatively to the question “Are science and religion often in conflict?”, only 36% said 
yes to the follow-up question, “Does science sometimes conflict with your own religious 
beliefs?”  
Though opinion polls tend to focus on adults’ beliefs, the conflict narrative is 
perhaps most salient in the American public school classroom.
1
 The most well-known 
example is likely the Scopes “Monkey Trial” (Scopes Case, 1927), in which the 
classroom teaching of evolution was debated in a dramatic and widely publicized court 
case, but it is just one of many legal and cultural battles that have contributed to the 
image of science and religion as being at odds in the educational context. Psychological 
research indicates that adult perceptions of science and religion have origins in early 
childhood (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007), and, as with adults, it seems unwise to assume that 
young learners intuitively gravitate toward the conflict model. As the anecdote in the 
introduction suggests, children’s questions do not always fall neatly within domain 
boundaries. Research indicates that children use parallel strategies to make sense of 
scientific and supernatural explanations for phenomena (Harris & Koenig, 2006), and that 
the conflict model fails to fully account for the complex processes that students use as 
they develop beliefs and attitudes toward science and religion (Koul, 2006; Abo-Zena & 
Mardell, 2015). Thus, in this paper I seek a more nuanced understanding of how children 
                                                          
1
As noted previously, though the potential for the conflict narrative to arise exists across many religious 
denominations, coverage of this topic in the United States tends to be focused on Christianity (Hanley, 
Bennett, & Ratcliffe, 2014). 
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reason about the nature of science and its relationship to religion, especially in the 
context of concepts that are widely seen as relevant to both domains.  
Children’s Reliance on Testimony from Others 
The Role of Testimony in Conceptual Development 
Historically, the research on how natural and supernatural reasoning coexist in the 
mind has been somewhat limited. Legare et al. (2012) posit that this lack of existing 
research may be because researchers did not traditionally see it as appropriate to 
empirically investigate supernatural thinking. However, cognitive developmental 
literature has emerged over the past ten to fifteen years that has begun to shine a light on 
the development of religious or spiritual conceptions and their relationship to other 
modes of reasoning.  
This research suggests that from an early age, there are parallels between the 
processes for how children learn about scientific and religious concepts. In both domains, 
there are numerous phenomena and entities that cannot be understood through first-hand 
experience; to learn about such concepts, children frequently rely on testimony presented 
by other, typically more knowledgeable individuals (Harris, 2002). In the domain of 
science, there are many concepts that are difficult or impossible for learners – especially 
young learners – to observe directly, often because they operate on very large or small 
spatial or temporal scales, and may involve causal relationships that are outside of the 
learner’s attentional frame (Grotzer & Solis, 2015). For instance, few children have the 
opportunity to view the shape of the earth (Nussbaum, 1985; Vosniadou & Brewer, 
1992), perceive the causal mechanisms underlying magnetic attraction (Lesser, 1997), or 
witness the biological processes involved in death (Harris & Giménez, 2005). Likewise, 
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although some research suggests that children are “intuitive theists” (Evans, 2000; 
Kelemen, 2004), testimony likely still has a large impact on their conceptions of spiritual 
matters, including the existence of a higher power and an afterlife, as well as the efficacy 
of prayer (Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
Counterintuitive phenomena, in particular, are often hard to conceptualize and 
impossible or challenging to verify through first-hand experience, and the research 
suggests that similar factors influence the acceptance of counterintuitive phenomena in 
both natural and supernatural domains (Lane & Harris, 2014). These factors include the 
developmental capacity of the recipient to conceptualize the idea, the context in which 
the information is presented, the demonstrated expertise of the informant, and the 
qualities of the information itself (such as whether or not the information as affective 
appeal, or the range of phenomena that an explanation covers). Thus, for both scientific 
and religious concepts, young learners are heavily dependent on the information provided 
by external sources, and the features of that informational transaction significantly 
influence understanding.  
 On some occasions, children may hear testimony – either from different sources, 
or from the same source in different contexts – that presents both scientific and religious 
explanations for the same concept. In these instances, the learner may compartmentalize 
these explanations as isolated concepts, or he or she must decide how to reconcile the 
potentially conflicting explanatory frameworks, whether by selecting one as the preferred 
explanation, choosing to apply one or the other depending on the context, or generating a 
new framework that combines or synthesizes the disparate claims. Children do seem to 
distinguish between scientific and religious domains in certain ways; notably, they 
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typically express greater confidence about the existence of scientific entities. This may 
stem from the fact that discourse around scientific entities tends to take their existence for 
granted, while language used to discuss special beings often includes assertions of belief 
or faith, which may lead children to recognize that some people doubt the existence of 
these beings. Alternatively, children may be aware of the lack of consensus amongst 
adults discussing special beings, leading to less confidence in their own assertions (Harris 
& Koenig, 2006). It is important to note that the majority of this research is focused on 
scientific phenomena that are typically deemed uncontroversial (e.g., atoms, germs); the 
parallels between scientific and religious reasoning patterns may perhaps be even more 
pronounced for topics that tend to evoke a greater sense of controversy or uncertainty for 
many people, such as climate change or human origins.   
Children also appear to employ strategies (whether consciously or 
subconsciously) for connecting the explanations they are familiar with to new scenarios; 
namely, when discussing concepts that have both scientific and religious explanations, 
children tend to offer context-appropriate accounts. For instance, when asked to provide 
an explanation for a character’s death in a narrative, a child who hears about the 
character’s corpse will likely apply a biological model, while a child who hears about 
ancestral rituals in the character’s community is more apt to apply a spiritual model 
(Harris & Koenig, 2006). Harris and Koenig (2006) also found that children who grow up 
in a community where conflicting testimony is frequently presented are likely to 
acknowledge the possible existence of multiple correct beliefs. However, they do not 
typically engage in a process for evaluating the relative merit of each belief, nor are they 
often capable of proposing methods for doing so. Thus, when faced with the challenge of 
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making sense of potentially contradictory statements, children may require explicit 
guidance about how to adjudicate between different types and sources of information. I 
will return to this notion below in the section on epistemology.  
The Nature of Testimony to Young Learners on Science and Religion 
Before children are of school-age, much of the early testimony they hear about 
both science and religion comes from parents, caregivers, and other members of their 
local community, often by way of spontaneous or informal discussions as well as more 
formal rituals. The literature on how adults talk to young children about science is 
somewhat limited, as compared to other domains like language and mathematics (Vlach 
& Noll, 2016). To date, the bulk of the research in this area has examined the types of 
explanations that children hear while engaged with adults in science talk at museums 
(e.g., Crowley et al., 2001; Haden, 2010) and in laboratory settings (e.g., Luce, Callanan, 
& Smilovic, 2013), though several studies have looked at scientific and causal language 
used in more naturalistic settings (e.g., Callanan & Oakes, 1992). 
Based on this existing research, it seems that many parents and caregivers 
regularly engage in what could be considered informal science talk as they explore and 
explain causal relationships, make connections to other experiences, and introduce new 
vocabulary with their young children (Callanan, et al., 2013).
2
 Though science learning 
may not be the primary purpose in such interactions, these everyday conversations are 
often more likely to be tailored to the interests and experiences of the particular child 
(Callanan et al., 2013). On the other hand, talking to children about science may pose a 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that the parents and caregivers included in the samples of these studies are the ones 
who have chosen to take their children to a research lab or a museum, and thus are not necessarily 
representative of the population as a whole. This limitation in the sample points to the need for further 
research in naturalistic, more inclusive settings. 
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particular set of challenges. While in many domains, adults intuitively talk to children in 
ways that are developmentally appropriate and beneficial to their learning, science may 
be an exception, given that adults tend to have less practice talking about scientific 
concepts with conversation partners of any age (Vlach & Noll, 2016).  
Adults seem to believe that they should adjust their language when talking to 
children about science, but they may not always know how to do this effectively. Vlach 
and Noll (2016) found that when asked to explain science concepts to a range of listeners, 
college-age adults provided more varied types of explanations to five-year-old children 
than to adults. These explanations included higher frequencies of beneficial features, such 
as analogies and connections to prior knowledge, but they also included higher 
frequencies of potentially disadvantageous or confusing features, such as personification 
and references to magic. However, when asked to reflect on their explanations, the study 
participants assessed their explanations to children as being more accurate than their 
explanations to adults. Vlach and Noll (2016) hypothesize that adults employ a greater 
number of explanatory features in their science talk with children because they are more 
concerned with correct instruction than they might be with adult interlocutors. They also 
posit that the inclusion of more disadvantageous features, such as magical or supernatural 
explanations, may reflect the belief that a secondary goal of explaining science to 
children is to make it more fun and engaging; this hypothesis is speculative at this point 
and warrants further empirical testing, especially given that if this is indeed a common 
belief among adults, there may be implications for how science is typically framed for 
young children in other educational settings. 
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In considering how children think about concepts that sit at the boundary of 
science and other domains, it is noteworthy that issues of morality often seem to 
spontaneously emerge in parent-child discussions about science. In three studies (one 
laboratory study with children in grades 3-5, and two museum studies with children aged 
3-10 years), Callanan et al. (2014) recorded conversations between parents and their 
children about a variety of science topics, including climate change and gender 
differences. The conversations were coded for instances in which moral issues were 
mentioned. The authors identified four categories of moral issues: avoiding harm or 
promoting care, promoting justice or fairness, being a good or responsible person, and 
tolerating differences or accepting essential truths. Callanan et al. (2014) found that 
topics of socialization and morality emerged throughout the discussions of science-
related topics, with parents and children “often slipping back and forth between notions 
of ideas that are factually ‘right’ versus morally ‘right’” (p. 121). However, the nature of 
the discussions about morality varied greatly based on the content domain at hand; i.e., 
parents and children introduced concepts of morality in different ways when talking 
about a physical domain than a social domain. Sometimes, references to moral issues 
were driven by the parent, in an apparent effort to seize the opportunity to attend to their 
child’s character development. In other cases, the discussion of morality stemmed from 
the child, who raised questions or expressed the adoption of a particular moral stance 
related to the topic at hand. 
More research is needed to determine the impact of these discussions of morality 
in the context of scientific explanations. Callanan et al. (2014) note that in regular 
conversation, we employ two distinct meanings for the word “right” – an epistemological 
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definition, in which something is evaluated for factual correctness, and a moral 
definition, in which something is evaluated for whether or not it is just or virtuous – and 
it may be that discussions such as the ones described above cause these definitions to get 
conflated in children’s minds. However, the authors also suggest that opportunistic 
discussions about morality could potentially be more impactful than strategic ones, as 
children may take particular note of topics that they interpret as being significant enough 
to warrant an interruption to the flow of conversation. Callanan et al. (2014) also posit 
that cultural or philosophical differences in worldview might impact the nature of 
discussions of morality that arise within conversations about science topics and the ideas 
that children take away from these conversations. The epistemological perspectives that 
parents implicitly or explicitly endorse are likely to impact their children’s ideas about 
how to answer questions and evaluate evidence (Luce, Callanan, & Smilovic, 2013). 
These findings merit further research to explore the potential impact of exposing 
children to the idea that morality is relevant to scientific issues. Notably, the topic of 
morality is often at the heart of religious conversations with young children, especially 
given that they are frequently learning about religion in the context of parables that lead 
to moral conclusions. It is possible that hearing about morality in both religious and 
scientific contexts may lead children to see connections between the two domains (e.g., 
by linking a stewardship narrative of the earth to concepts of ecology and 
environmentalism). Alternatively, if the concept of morality is discussed differently in the 
scientific context than the religious context, a child may perceive further distinctions 
between the two domains. 
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The Developmental Trajectory of Processing Scientific and Religious Testimony 
Many of the ideas that young children form about science and religion persist into 
adulthood. To some extent, supernatural explanatory frameworks seem rooted in human 
cognitive architecture. Though the developmental literature has traditionally argued that 
supernatural explanations are supplanted by natural explanations over time, it is clear that 
supernatural explanations do remain prevalent in adult cognition across cultures (Legare, 
Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). Moreover, the generalized preference for teleological 
explanations exhibited by children seems to carry over into an adult tendency to perceive 
an inherent purpose in significant life events (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014). Teleological 
intuitions, including those about natural phenomena, persist even for adults who do not 
identify as religious – and in fact, even among those who claim aversion to religion 
(Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). Regardless of age, religion, or cultural identity, 
individuals show a tendency to default to teleological explanations for phenomena when 
placed under time pressure, which supports a dual process theory hypothesis that 
intentional explanations are largely due to inherent aspects of human cognition (Järnefelt, 
Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). This may account for the apparent universality of both 
natural and supernatural belief systems across societies, leading the coordination among 
these various explanatory frameworks to be deemed a “general cognitive problem” 
(Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, 2011, p. 114). 
However, the process of grappling with these domains also appears to follow a 
developmental trajectory, with the influence of caregivers, community members, and 
other external sources of information holding different weight at different stages. In early 
childhood, exposure to religious ideas is correlated with children’s tendencies to believe 
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in, and invoke, supernatural explanations. Corriveau, Chen, and Harris (2015) found a 
sharp distinction between kindergarteners with and without systematic exposure to 
religion (through school or church), with the children raised in a religious environment 
conceiving of a notably broader range of plausible phenomena than their secular peers. 
This discrepancy – and the fact that secular children relied on references to religion as 
justification for deeming phenomena to be pretend – suggests that a religious upbringing 
seems to override children’s natural tendencies to doubt unlikely causal phenomena 
(rather than the converse notion that a secular upbringing overrides a predisposition 
toward credulity). Additionally, in early childhood, the tendency to invoke creationist 
explanations for the origins of species corresponds to the child’s religious background. In 
interviews with children and adults from fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist 
communities about the origins of various species, Evans (2008) found that children aged 
5-7 provided a mix of responses categorized as spontaneous generationist (suggesting 
that the species simply appeared) or creationist (referencing a supernatural power), with 
children from fundamentalist communities providing a higher frequency of creationist 
responses.  
By middle childhood, however, children are more likely to receive a diversity of 
messages from various sources, and they begin to formulate individual ideas about the 
world that may reflect new developmental capacities as well as their attempts to account 
for multiple explanatory frameworks. In the interview study with fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist individuals described above, 8-10 year olds tended to endorse creationist 
ideas regardless of their community background. Evans (2008) suggests that at this age, 
children are beginning to confront existential questions (Evans, Mull, & Poling, 2001) 
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and are developing the ability to reason about the possible existence of an intelligent 
designer, whereas younger children are not likely to accept the premise that animals and 
artifacts are impermanent and therefore struggle to reason about origins. While this 
reasoning pattern does not reflect a scientific worldview, the ability to conceive of 
impermanence does indicate that children at this age may be prepared to begin thinking 
about evolutionary concepts if they are introduced (e.g., Kelemen et al., 2014), or at the 
very least, to recognize that there are multiple possible explanatory frameworks.  
Grappling with Multiple Explanations 
 As children’s worlds expand and they are exposed to ideas from a variety of 
sources, they begin to face the cognitive challenge of reconciling conflicting testimony. 
Memory research suggests that information – whether true or false – is filed in the brain 
“without being ‘tagged’ as to source or credibility” (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 267). When the 
information is later retrieved, the individual must therefore infer these features and make 
a determination about whether or not it is believable; this task becomes more challenging 
when multiple explanations must be weighed against each other and reconciled. 
Ultimately, an individual may choose to adopt one explanation over the other, or to 
permit both explanations to mentally coexist, either by compartmentalizing them or 
integrating them in some way. Both compartmentalization and integration are likely to 
require metacognitive abilities and cognitive adaptability (Legare et al., 2012).  
Legare et al. (2012) refer to the process of holding multiple explanatory 
frameworks as coexistence thinking. There are a number of features that characterize 
concepts that tend to invoke coexistence thinking, including the involvement of hidden or 
unobservable causal agents, association with strong emotions, and a relationship to 
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existing cultural practices that pre-date formal science (Legare et al., 2012). 
Unsurprisingly, coexistence thinking occurs frequently with phenomena for which both 
natural and supernatural explanations are presented. 
Individuals may invoke a variety of frameworks for reasoning about the 
coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations for a given phenomenon (Legare et 
al., 2012). In target-dependent thinking, the conflict remains unresolved in one’s mind; 
one explanation or the other is recruited to account for a particular aspect of the 
phenomenon based on the context at hand. Elkana (1981) suggests that although people 
often use context to determine which source of knowledge is appropriate, “in the event of 
a serious clash, the knowledge source with the greatest personal legitimacy and value 
(scope and force) will prevail” (Cobern, 1996, p. 594-5). In synthetic thinking, on the 
other hand, the two different explanations are loosely integrated into one framework, 
though without explicit consideration of how they fit together. Finally, in integrated 
thinking, the two different explanations are more thoroughly interwoven, often in a model 
that relies on each domain for a different level of analysis (e.g., one might cite a natural 
proximate cause and a supernatural ultimate cause). Synthetic and integrated models, 
which are constructed to resolve a state of cognitive (and sometimes emotional) conflict, 
are likely closely held and may be particularly challenging to abandon or adjust (Evans, 
Legare, & Rosengren, 2011). Evans and Lane (2011) argue that holding blended models 
also requires the activation of system 2 reflective processing (Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Kahneman, 2003), in that individuals who endorse a hybrid of scientific and religious 
conceptions are demonstrating the ability to “rapidly shift between different reasoning 
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patterns” and ultimately taking an analytic (rather than purely intuitive) approach (p. 
156).  
Coexistence thinking can also arise out of a need to make sense of 
counterintuitive information. Evaluating counterintuitive information entails a great deal 
of cognitive load, as the individual must engage in the process of shifting back and forth 
between one’s own perception of how things appear and the conflicting representation of 
how things are asserted to be (Lane & Harris, 2014). Lane and Harris (2014) note that 
most prominent models of belief formation (originating from philosophers such as 
Descartes and Spinoza) are based on the premise that the learner begins by creating a 
mental representation of a given claim. Thus, these models fail to account for scenarios in 
which the learner has difficulty developing a cognitive representation, such as with 
counterintuitive concepts. In these cases, the learner may exhibit a tendency to disbelieve 
the claim that is not easily represented. Lane and Harris (2014) posit that the tendency to 
accept counterintuitive explanations is influenced by the developmental capacity of an 
individual to produce these mental representations. This is supported by research 
demonstrating that young children are particularly skeptical of evidence that conflicts 
with their personal experience and beliefs (Lane & Harris, 2014). As such, children may 
struggle to reckon with testimony that presents an explanatory framework running 
counter to earlier explanations and/or first-hand experiences, which often occurs for 
children who are not exposed to scientific models until they enter school (Billingsley et 
al., 2014). 
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Epistemological Understanding 
The Developmental Trajectory of Epistemological Understanding 
Making sense of the relationship between scientific and religious explanatory 
frameworks as described above requires an understanding of each domain’s epistemology 
– their conception of the nature of knowledge and knowing. The discussion of multiple 
epistemologies is not uncommon among academics and clergy, many of whom see it as a 
professional responsibility to acknowledge and respond to potential areas of conflict that 
arise from differences between the epistemological lenses of their domain and other ways 
of knowing (e.g., Gottlieb & Wineberg, 2012). While any given discipline or domain 
tends to have some overarching unifying epistemological principles that distinguish it 
from other fields, individuals also hold their own conceptions of the nature of knowledge, 
what Burr and Hofer (2002) refer to as “personal epistemology.” Less research has been 
done about how individuals, especially those in the lay public, reason about epistemology 
(Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, 2011), but the existing literature suggests that 
epistemological understanding follows a developmental trajectory, with children 
beginning to draw on multiple epistemological frameworks as early as 3-5 years of age 
(Legare et al., 2012). 
In the literature, the earliest stage of epistemological development is typically 
described as a dualist or absolutist perspective, in which the individual believes in a sense 
of right and wrong and the notion that truth can be known with certainty. As most of the 
research on epistemological development has been conducted with adolescents and 
adults, little is known about the earliest stages of the developmental process or whether 
there are any stages that precede dualism. Some have posited that there is a pre-dualistic 
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stage of naïve realism, in which children believe that there is no possible perspective 
other than their own. For instance, Burr and Hofer (2002) found that very young children 
(around age 3) struggle to complete an epistemology task in which they have to explain 
why a character lacks knowledge that they possess. Young children’s difficulty with 
theory of mind tasks may also support the idea of a naïve realism stage (Burr & Hofer, 
2002). However, in a review of the theory of mind literature, Wellman (2014) points to 
evidence that 3-year-olds do demonstrate the ability to distinguish between individuals 
holding different beliefs.  
The ability to reason about categories of knowledge also improves 
developmentally. Even very young children comprehend the distinctions between factual 
and opinion-based judgments; they understand, for instance, that reasoning about the 
physical world involves a higher degree of certainty than reasoning about matters of 
aesthetic preference (Hofer, Lam, & DeLisi, 2011). By age 4, children begin to 
demonstrate the ability to make judgments about expertise that rely on cognitive schema 
representing abstract domain categories (Lutz & Keil, 2002). For instance, many children 
at this age can recognize that a doctor would be more likely to possess knowledge within 
the domain of biology, while an automotive technician would be more likely to possess 
knowledge within the domain of physical mechanics. However, 4 and 5 year olds 
struggle to abstract knowledge clusters to broader disciplines when the experts in 
question are unfamiliar (e.g., an eagle expert or a bicycle expert). In a study of children in 
Kindergarten through Grade 6, Danovitch and Keil (2004) found that younger children 
tended to select expert consultants for a task based on their reported topic knowledge, 
while older children were more likely to select consultants based on their understanding 
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of deeper disciplinary relationships. Children likely struggle to characterize knowledge 
by discipline because this task requires being sensitive to deep structural relationships 
between concepts rather than attending simply to surface-level features (Danovitch & 
Keil, 2004).  
As children get older, their capability to reason about domain differences 
improves, but they still demonstrate different patterns of epistemological thinking than 
adults. For instance, children have different ideas about the relationship between 
knowledge or belief and the individual expressing that knowledge or belief. In a series of 
experiments, Heiphetz et al. (2014) presented adults and children aged 8-10 with a set of 
characters who made various factual, opinion-based, or religious statements. Participants 
were asked whether each statement offered more information about the world or about 
the person making the statement. Both children and adults reported that they learned 
more about the world than about the individual from statements of correct factual belief. 
However, upon hearing an individual make a statement about religious beliefs, adults 
reported that they had learned more about the individual making the statement than about 
the nature of the world, whereas children reported the reverse. Heiphetz et al. (2014) 
suggest that the difference between how children and adults perceive religious statements 
may stem from the fact that adults have had more exposure to religious diversity and 
disagreements, though they also note that children do seem to understand the concept of a 
lack of consensus around theological claims. The authors conclude that there is still 
“much to learn … about how children situate religious beliefs within a larger 
epistemological framework” (Heiphetz et al., 2014, p. 27). 
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Implications of Epistemological Understanding for Science Learning 
There is an extensive body of research on the nature of science that explores how 
students understand science as a way of knowing and considers the implications for how 
science is taught in the classroom (see Lederman, 1992 for a review of the literature). A 
number of studies have also specifically examined how students understand science in 
relationship to other ways of knowing, though most of the existing literature focuses on 
older learners. Several researchers have proposed typologies or frameworks to 
characterize how features such as knowledge, evidence, and certainty are viewed through 
scientific and religious epistemological lenses. For instance, Sinatra and Nadelson (2011) 
suggest that the epistemological assumptions promulgated by science and religion as 
institutions can be seen as existing at opposite ends of four continua: source of 
knowledge, justification of knowledge, certainty of knowledge, and structure of 
knowledge. Elsewhere, based on their research of science instruction in British secondary 
schools, Hanley, Bennett, and Ratcliffe (2014) developed a typology to characterize 
student engagement with topics pertaining to science and religion. The typology was 
developed based on students’ views across several dimensions, including the value they 
placed on evidence versus belief, their open-mindedness, and their tolerance of 
uncertainty. Though a focus group of teachers reported that their students did not hold 
any views that were irreconcilable with scientific explanatory frameworks, surveys and 
interviews with students about their understanding of the origin of life revealed that many 
did in fact hold epistemological stances that were serving as roadblocks to scientific 
understanding.  
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Shtulman and colleagues (e.g., Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Shtulman, 2013; 
Shtulman & Harrington, 2016) have also conducted extensive research on how students, 
especially college students, reason about scientific principles that run counter to intuitive 
beliefs, as well as the students’ explanations for why they hold particular conceptions. 
Shtulman (2013) found in a study of undergraduates that the most common form of 
justification for both scientific and supernatural beliefs was through deference to the 
opinions and conclusions of others, echoing the findings of Harris and Koenig (2006) 
with younger children. Moreover, individuals’ reported confidence in their beliefs in both 
scientific and supernatural phenomena was more strongly associated with perception of 
consensus about the explanation than with the acknowledgement of available evidence. 
Shtulman’s (2013) findings also reveal a correlation between students’ understanding of 
the nature of science and their tendency to offer evidential justifications for their beliefs 
(as opposed to deferential or subjective justifications), though Shtulman suggests that 
more research is needed to understand the nature of this relationship.  
Brain imaging research provides an interesting accompaniment to these findings. 
For instance, Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) found that when people were presented with 
information that was consistent with their prior theories about a scientific concept, the 
parts of their brain associated with learning showed increased activity. In contrast, when 
people were given data that contradicted their prior theories, they showed activation in 
the parts of their brain involved in error detection, conflict monitoring, effortful 
processing, and working memory. As noted by Dunbar, Fugelsang and Stein (2007), the 
fact that information inconsistent with one’s prior conceptions is neurologically 
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processed as an error points to the significant challenges and complexity inherent in 
conceptual change. 
One factor that may confound learners who are trying to make sense of scientific 
explanations is the many diverse uses of the terms knowledge and belief within science 
education and in everyday talk (Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001). In particular, a 
number of researchers have argued that the common usage of the word belief, which in 
everyday language can imply the existence of doubt, causes confusion regarding the 
scientific approach to theories (e.g., Cobern, 2000; Smith, 1994; National Academy of 
Sciences, 1998). For instance, a statement that scientists believe in the theory of evolution 
may be interpreted by a layperson to mean that this belief is tentative or uncertain 
(Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001). 
Southerland, Sinatra, and Matthews (2001) posit that much of science education 
research is based on the epistemological position of fallibility. Within a fallibilist 
epistemology (Siegel, 1998), certainty is not a condition of knowledge; the fallibilist 
stance maintains that explanations can be compared and judged for quality despite the 
premise that human knowledge is imperfect. Beliefs, in contrast, are held by fallibilists to 
be subjective, personal truths that do not rely on evidence and are often laden with 
emotion. Thus, Southerland, Sinatra, and Matthews (2001) propose that drawing a 
distinction between knowledge and belief may lie in identifying the “type and number of 
warrants” that a person holds for a given piece of information (p. 336). In other words, if 
an individual produces a limited number of justifications, or if the justifications would be 
deemed weak by scientific epistemological standards (e.g., thinking something is true 
because a friend said so), then the piece of information should be considered a belief 
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rather than knowledge.
3
 Using this framework, one can understand how the same 
statement could be knowledge to one person and a belief to another.  
To avoid conflating inaccurate ideas with ideas that are non-empirically based, 
some researchers advocate for the use of the term alternative conception (e.g., 
Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994) to refer to ideas that are not beliefs but rather 
incorrect, but empirically grounded, explanations (Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 
2001). Additionally, Smith and his colleagues have proposed that the term acceptance 
more appropriately represents the scientific process of evaluating evidence and 
concluding that a theory is the best possible explanation given the available information 
(Smith et al., 1995). This distinction between acceptance and belief foregrounds the 
epistemological lens of science, in which validity is based on the evaluation of evidence 
rather than personal opinion.  
Many researchers and educators have made the distinction between understanding 
and belief as potential aims of science education, suggesting, for instance, that while 
students should be required to understand the theory of evolution, it is inappropriate and 
likely impossible to require them to believe it. Southerland, Sinatra, and Matthews (2001) 
group acceptance with belief; though they acknowledge that the idea of acceptance 
implies more agency on the part of the learner than does belief, they argue that both 
agency and belief should be seen as goals of science education rather than requirements, 
as students cannot make an informed choice to believe or accept a given theory until they 
have achieved a deep understanding of the evidence. 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that beliefs are typically based on rationales; the claim is simply that these 
rationales are not empirical (Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001). They may instead be grounded in 
other types of reasoning, such as a community consensus or the reliance on a trusted authority figure.  
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While the goals of science education remain an open question in the literature, it 
seems safe to conclude that an awareness of epistemological assumptions inherent to 
science and how those differ from other ways of knowing is a necessary condition for 
understanding and evaluating conflicting explanatory frameworks. However, it is not 
sufficient to pursue this as a purely intellectual endeavor. In the following section, I will 
explore the social and affective components that factor into the process of engaging in 
thinking that runs counter to intuitive or culturally familiar ideas.  
Science Learning in Context 
The Need for “Hot Conceptual Change” 
The research described in the sections above provides insight into the cognitive 
processes that occur as learners acquire and make sense of information derived from 
scientific and religious ways of knowing. Of course, learning happens in context, and the 
nature of the learning environment must factor in to any consideration of how conceptual 
understanding develops. Notably, learners undergo a shift when they enter school and 
begin to receive formal science instruction. For any learner, thinking about science in a 
school setting may present certain challenges, but this transition can be particularly 
difficult for learners for whom the classroom approach to science is entirely novel or 
misaligned with their prior experience.  
Geary (2008) describes formal schooling as “a central interface between evolution 
and culture” (p. 179): schools are a cultural innovation designed to close the gap between 
children’s “folk knowledge” and the information required to be successful in adult 
society. For many students, this gap is particularly evident in science education, where 
intuitive ideas and early testimony provided by families and communities may regularly 
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conflict with the concepts presented in the classroom. In addressing such conflicts, 
learners must decide whether to maintain or revise deeply held beliefs, and they must 
come to terms with the implications embedded in the new conceptions being presented, 
which are often both personal and existential. 
The sense-making process that learners must undergo in order to grasp new 
scientific explanatory frameworks, especially those that are complex or counterintuitive, 
is often understood through the lens of conceptual change. New information does not 
automatically trigger conceptual change; instead, for a learner to adopt a new conception, 
she must acknowledge that there is a conflict between the explanation she currently holds 
and the new explanation being presented, and she must be willing to seek resolution for 
that conflict (Strike & Posner, 1982). Thus, a critical first step in the conceptual change 
process is to reveal the learner’s present understanding in order to hold it up to a 
contrasting model. For concepts that sit at the boundary of science and religion, the 
conceptual change process presents a unique set of challenges. In the course of 
unearthing one’s current understanding about concepts such as cosmology or human 
origins, the learner may encounter ideas that are deeply entrenched and emotionally 
charged. For instance, Evans (2008) notes that it is critical to consider the emotional 
components to teaching evolutionary theory, as the ideas of impermanence and mutability 
of kinds may lead to “existential angst” (p. 283) for both children and adults (though this 
may be more the case when confronting the idea of human origins than with other 
species). Other topics introduced in the science classroom may bear similar implications 
for human identity and mortality. They may also cause learners to confront their existing 
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beliefs in supernatural entities and phenomena, as well as their personal affiliations with 
religious or cultural communities (Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, 2011; Gelman, 2011). 
For the reasons just described, some researchers have suggested that conceptual 
change is limiting as a framework for understanding how learners engage with new 
concepts. For instance, Long (2013) argues that there is a tendency to view the purpose of 
education as correcting misconceptions one student at a time, which he believes fails to 
account for the social nature of conceptual development, in which learners construct 
knowledge through the process of engaging with other individuals whose ideas and 
perspectives interact with their own in complex ways. More specifically to science 
education, Cobern (1996) found through a series of interviews with a student and her 
teacher that improving conceptual change tactics is insufficient as a method for helping a 
learner whose worldview is causing resistance to what is being taught. Hanley, Bennett, 
and Ratcliffe (2014) suggest that conceptual change is inappropriate for viewing the 
teaching of evolutionary theory, because it diminishes the affective dimension of the 
learning and presents all beliefs not supported by conventional Western science as 
misconceptions. 
Many traditional arguments in the conceptual change literature take the 
perspective that this is a process that is disconnected from emotional or social factors. 
However, other researchers have made the case for a more nuanced understanding of 
conceptual development that accounts for the contextual nature of learning. The 
phenomenon of “hot cognition” (Abelson, 1963) is widely referenced in the literature and 
refers to the idea that reasoning is impacted by an individual’s emotional state. Pintrich, 
Marx, and Boyle (1993) extend this to suggest a “hot” model of conceptual change, 
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acknowledging that whether or not conceptual change occurs is influenced by a variety of 
“personal, motivational, social, and historical processes” (p. 170). Additionally, the 
literature on situated cognition offers a lens for thinking about learning in the context of 
the physical setting where learning takes place and the community of practitioners who 
engage together in the learning process (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989). Rather than 
relying on an approach to science education that views conceptual change as a process in 
which the learner abandons prior knowledge for another, more acceptable conception, 
some researchers in the situated cognition field have advocated for a model in which 
students learn to think and operate in both the formal science domain and their everyday 
notions of science, and to distinguish the contexts in which particular conceptions are 
appropriate (Hennessy, 1993).  
Border Crossing and the Compartmentalization of Knowledge 
For many students, the relationship between school science and the rest of their 
lives is complex, and navigating between these contexts does not always come easily. 
Cobern (1996) observes that there is an implicit argument that scientific literacy should 
be viewed as distinct from the “everyday world,” despite the fact that this everyday world 
is presumably the context in which most people will make use of their scientific 
knowledge (p. 582). Yet, it is unwise to assume that students will naturally “approach 
their classroom learning with a rational goal of making sense of the information and 
coordinating it with their prior conceptions” (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993, p. 173). In 
everyday life, individuals tend to satisfice, looking for information that will allow them to 
adequately explain and predict phenomena, rather than the optimal explanations and 
predictions that are sought through the process of scientific inquiry (Reif & Larkin, 
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1991). This everyday model of satisficing may more accurately represent the 
understanding that occurs in classroom contexts than the scientific conceptual change 
model, unless the classroom in question has a climate that encourages a commitment to 
deep understanding and is sensitive to the unique needs of the students present (Pintrich, 
Marx, & Boyle, 1993). 
Research on the concept of worldviews informs the thinking about how students 
experience school science. Kearney (1984) defines worldview as “conceptually organized 
macrothought” (p. 1); an individual’s worldview comprises the set of assumptions 
determining his or her behavior and decision making. Even when students do not 
experience a significant conflict between the various worldviews they have been 
presented, they will frequently compartmentalize “school knowledge” – especially school 
science – perceiving it as existing independently of their daily lives. They may retrieve 
the science they have learned in school as necessary for homework and exams, but do not 
think to apply it to situations in the outside world, and let go of it once the school 
requirements have been completed (Cobern, 1996). Moreover, students’ prior knowledge 
may lead them to construct intentions and conclusions that do not align with the teacher’s 
actual agenda (Hennessy, 1993). For instance, while science teachers tend to immediately 
evoke science when describing nature, students may more naturally conjure up “aesthetic, 
religious, pragmatic, and emotional concepts” (Cobern, 1996, p. 596).  
The process of compartmentalization seems to be more pronounced for students 
who experience a discord between school science and their indigenous beliefs. For these 
students, the process of border crossing between the “microcultures” of their home life 
and the science classroom can be challenging and even traumatic; such students may go 
34 
 
so far as to exhibit significant “creativity and intransigence” in order to avoid deep 
understanding or acceptance of science concepts (Aikenhead & Jegede, 1999, p. 275). 
Cobern (1996) argues that the goal often assumed in the science education literature of 
moving students toward a “scientific worldview” is problematic because it fails to 
acknowledge that for some students, this notion implies the need to reject their current 
deeply held conceptions. Instead, he suggests that the goal should be to help students 
develop a “scientifically compatible worldview,” which accounts for the idea that an 
individual will only make use of scientific ideas if they align with how he already makes 
sense of himself and of the world. 
Jegede (1995) puts forth the theory of collateral learning as a model that 
foregrounds the culture of the learner as critical to the process of understanding science. 
Though Jegede originally employed the theory in the study of African learners engaging 
with Western notions of science, the principles are useful in understanding American 
classroom contexts as well. In the process of collateral learning, individuals construct an 
understanding of concepts taught in school alongside the prior understandings they have 
developed from their home communities. Different categories of collateral learning exist 
along a continuum. At one end, parallel collateral learning occurs when the learner 
encounters a new idea which is in opposition to his or her prior understanding, but does 
not perceive disequilibrium between the two concepts, possibly because the learner does 
not have enough understanding or experience to consider how they might conflict. On the 
other end is secured collateral learning, in which the learner grapples with the cognitive 
conflict between two conceptions and works toward reconciliation of them within his or 
her broader worldview. Jegede (1995) argues that effective science education requires 
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understanding learning through a conceptual ecocultural paradigm, “a state in which the 
growth and development of an individual’s perception of knowledge is drawn from the 
sociocultural environment in which the learner lives and operates” (p. 124). 
In sum, as is the case with any other form of learning, science learning does not 
happen in a vacuum. The research sends a clear signal that the process of science learning 
cannot be understood without careful consideration of how the learners’ prior knowledge 
and cultural background interact with the material presented during formal science 
instruction.  Any learner is apt to experience some amount of discomfort when studying 
counterintuitive concepts with potentially existential implications. For students whose 
prior experience with these topics has been largely or solely through religious 
frameworks, encountering these concepts in the school science setting is likely to be 
particularly jarring. Without careful instruction that provides the necessary time and 
space to grapple with conflict, learners may consciously or subconsciously avoid deep 
understanding.  
Implications for Pedagogy 
Much of the research synthesized above comes from the fields of cognition and 
development, where researchers tend to remain largely agnostic regarding the practical 
implications of the work. However, in the literature that comes out of the science 
education research space (such as Jegede’s work on collateral learning), a number of 
concrete recommendations for classroom practice have been put forth. Overall, 
researchers seem to agree that there is pedagogical value in incorporating discussions of 
learners’ religious beliefs as they interact with the scientific concepts being introduced in 
the classrooms, though there are differences in the recommendations for how these 
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conversations unfold. In this section, I will outline some notable conclusions drawn from 
the research and highlight important areas of disagreement. 
Helping Students Draw Connections to Prior Knowledge and Beliefs 
 One clear message from the literature is that teachers have an important role to 
play in encouraging their students to reveal their initial understandings, and, as necessary, 
helping them to navigate the process of border crossing between the science classroom 
and the rest of their lives. Callanan et al. (2013) argue for the importance of making 
intentional and meaningful linkages between students’ informal science experiences and 
the more formal science learning that happens in school. In particular, they suggest that 
children “may need guidance to recognize the rich background they themselves bring to 
the science classroom by virtue of their participation in conversations and activities from 
their everyday lives” (Callanan et al., 2013, p. 46). Rather than striving to simply 
“convert” students from their inherent beliefs to the acceptance of scientific explanations, 
Jegede (1995) argues that school science should aim to help students identify contexts in 
which their prior understandings are valuable. If this is not achieved, Jegede (1995) 
cautions, a student may maintain a barrier between his or her various contexts, perhaps 
managing to perform successfully in school science without developing the inclination to 
apply these understandings outside the classroom.  
Teachers can help their students constructively engage with topics at the boundary 
of science and religion by acting as a “culture broker” (Aikenhead & Jegede, 1999) who 
facilitates students’ movement across domains. Of course, this requires teachers to deeply 
know their students, including those who may be in the silent minority (or even majority). 
Cobern (1996) argues that science educators must “understand the fundamental, 
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culturally based beliefs about the world that students bring to class, and how these beliefs 
are supported by students’ cultures; because, science education is successful only to the 
extent that science can find a niche in the cognitive and socio-cultural milieu of students” 
(p. 603). This task also entails establishing an environment in which students are 
comfortable sharing their ideas, even if they suspect that they may not align with 
scientifically accepted explanations. Hanley, Bennett, and Ratcliffe (2014) suggest that 
science teachers should build classroom cultures that permit all students to participate 
“without risking self-censorship or estrangement” (p. 1225).  
Considering Religion through the Lens of Epistemology 
 It is evident from the literature that culture and religion are critical mediating 
factors that must be considered in any analysis of how students interact with school 
science (Hanley, Bennett, & Ratcliffe, 2014). Over the years, a number of researchers 
have advocated for the explicit acknowledgement and exploration of religion through 
historical and cultural lenses, even in public school settings. Sinatra and Nadelson (2011) 
claim that in such a highly religious country as the United States, calls for a rejection of 
religion in order to improve science education (e.g., Dawkins, 2006) are both implausible 
and unnecessary, and Postman (1995) makes a strong argument for advancing religious 
education based on its prominence in daily life and its interaction with other domains, 
including science. More recently, Long (2013) has argued that providing students with 
formal education about religion encourages them to embrace inclusivity, whether they 
choose to personally adopt a religious tradition or not. For educators who take a radical 
constructivist approach to learning, the act of “relegat[ing] beliefs to the outskirts of 
instruction” fails to account for the many types of reasoning that learners bring to the 
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table, and may lead students to ask, “if science can't answer my question about this, what 
is it good for?” (Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001, p. 344).  
Yet, the majority of researchers in science education do seem to caution that 
introducing ideas about religion must be done carefully and strategically, so as not to 
imply that scientific and religious ways of knowing are interchangeable. The clearest path 
forward seems to be an increased focus on the nature of science and its epistemological 
similarities and differences to other domains. Many researchers align with Gould’s 
(1999) model of non-overlapping magisteria, arguing that science and religion are 
capable of coexisting because the set of assumptions embedded within each way of 
knowing is distinct. Rather than conceiving of science and religion as conflicting 
domains, the two “should be viewed as epistemologies that have different roles and 
explain different aspects of the human condition” (Sinatra and Nadelson, 2011, p. 175). 
Explicitly differentiating between these two ways of knowing can provide learners with 
“a place to stand” (Southerland, Sinatra, & Mathews, 2001). To be able to explain why 
science and religion purport differing views on origins, for instance, students need to 
possess a high level of “epistemic insight” (Billingsley et al., 2014). In order to move 
towards this greater insight, Billingsley et al. (2014) suggest that students should have 
more opportunities to “consider and compare the natures of science and religion” (p. 
1729). Cobern (1996) also recommends that science should be taught in conjunction with 
other academic disciplines for the purposes of helping students develop a “coherence 
view of knowledge” (p. 601) that more closely aligns with how knowledge is organized 
and used in one’s daily life. 
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Researchers disagree about the most appropriate time and place to have these 
comparative discussions. Some have proposed that religion should be addressed in 
school, but not during science class. For instance, Evans, Legare, and Rosengren (2011) 
express a concern that incorporating discussions about religious explanatory frameworks 
into the science classroom may encourage students to construct inaccurate scientific 
models, though they do suggest that these conversations “might well have a role in the 
broader curriculum” (p. 131), given that children come to school with a wide variety of 
epistemological lenses. Sinatra and Nadelson (2011) suggest it is valuable to compare 
and contrast the epistemologies of science and religion, but they do not deem it 
appropriate for science teachers to present particular non-scientific explanations 
alongside scientific ones, as such an approach may lead students to believe that the 
alternative explanations are on par. However, they do propose that science teachers 
should welcome the discussion of historical and contemporary controversies within 
science (e.g., plate tectonics, the details of mass extinction events, etc.). The critical 
exploration of these debates within science is likely to help students understand the 
nature and epistemology of the domain. On the other hand, in response to the fear that 
introducing the idea that some people might disagree with a particular concept will 
automatically undercut the science, Hanley, Bennett, and Ratcliffe (2014) posit that a 
teachers’ acknowledgement that a topic could be seen by some as controversial might 
provide an entry point into the discussion for certain students who would otherwise feel 
alienated. Others have argued that “quarantining” supernatural beliefs from the science 
classroom leads teachers and students to miss out on rich opportunities to explicitly 
consider the epistemological distinctions between the domains. Rather than being left out 
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of classroom discussions, supernatural beliefs “should stand subject to the same kinds of 
empirical and theoretical scrutiny” as scientific beliefs (Shtulman, 2013, p. 208). 
Of those who suggest that religious ideas can be productively acknowledged in 
science discussions, many recommend the strategy of “teaching the demarcation” – i.e., 
teachers should explore with students how science is in certain ways distinct from other 
ways of knowing and in other ways similar. As such, a critical understanding goal for 
science instruction should be that students are capable of identifying scientific 
approaches to a given topic, and distinguishing those from approaches that come from 
other domains (Ferrari & Taylor, 2010). Eflin, Glennan, and Reisch (1999) agree that 
science education should include the issue of demarcation, but they express concern that 
discussion of the subtle relationships between psychological, epistemological, and 
metaphysical issues “is likely to create more confusion than insight” for learners (p. 114).  
Thus, while there seems to be some consensus around the idea that it is valuable 
to make some space for students’ religious beliefs and supernatural explanations in a 
formal educational context, it remains inconclusive in the literature how this should be 
done or whether science classrooms are the appropriate location for these discussions – 
and given that every classroom is different, a universal set of “best practices” is unlikely 
to exist. However, I would argue that the research reviewed above makes a clear case 
against the status quo of acting as though students enter the classroom as blank slates 
without exposure to complex, and potentially conflicting, ideas about science and religion 
as ways of knowing. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
 Some additional insights and questions emerged from the literature that may hold 
promise for future research endeavors. First, and critically, more basic research is needed 
on religious and supernatural thinking, which seems to necessitate a change of mindset 
regarding the value of this work. Legare et al. (2012) express a hope to see future 
research that “treats supernatural cognition as an integral part of cognitive developmental 
theory and not as an early or primitive mode of thinking that is outgrown in the course of 
cognitive development” (p. 791). For instance, we do not yet have an understanding of 
why some children are better at developing integrated reasoning schemes than others. It is 
possible that some individual differences are due to influence from adults, but it is also 
plausible that that the differences are due to particular cognitive characteristics. Certain 
life events and the explanations that are subsequently presented to children may also 
prompt them to seek more integrated frameworks (Legare et al., 2012). Future research 
that can tease apart these distinctions would be valuable to the field of cognitive 
development, and also of great use to educators seeking to understand how these 
cognitive processes could inform pedagogy.  
Another important question to consider moving forward is how teacher 
development could be informed by a better understanding of how learners think about 
science and religion. Researchers have been recommending that pre-service teachers 
study the philosophy and history of science since the 1960s, after a number of studies 
(e.g., Miller, 1963; Schmidt, 1967) found evidence that teachers lacked a solid 
understanding of the nature of science – in some cases, demonstrating even less 
understanding than their students (Lederman, 1992). However, there have not been 
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similar recommendations for teachers to study religion or its relationship to other 
academic domains; at present, there is no explicit focus on religion in an overview of the 
research on programs for teacher development and preparation (Abo-Zena & Mardell, 
2015; Ball & Tyson, 2011). This is particularly noteworthy because, compared to other 
professions, the population of teachers in the United States is a highly religious one. Not 
only is education a popular choice of major for incoming American college students who 
identify as religious, but majoring in education actually appears to be associated with an 
increase in reported religiosity over time (Kimball et al., 2009). Thus, it seems that it 
would be of value for teachers, including science teachers, to reflect on how their own 
ideas about religion may influence their teaching practice. For instance, Evans and Lane 
(2011) posit that science teachers tasked with teaching evolutionary theory could develop 
greater confidence in dealing with the various theological stances that students may bring 
to the classroom – as well as any religious conceptions of origins that the teachers 
themselves possess – if such ideas were explicitly addressed in teacher preparation 
programs.   
Additionally, it appears evident that there is value to beginning these 
conversations at an early age. For instance, in a study examining the effectiveness of a 
storybook intervention designed to teach evolutionary mechanisms, Kelemen et al. (2014) 
found that five- to eight-year-olds demonstrated growth in their understanding of 
adaptation at the population level, and the older children in particular were capable of 
generalizing beyond the narrative to other species. In light of these findings, Kelemen et 
al. (2014) argue that is best to introduce students to counterintuitive scientific concepts at 
a young age, when they are less beholden to alternative commonsense explanations. From 
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the perspective of religious education, Abo-Zena and Mardell (2015) found through a 
case study of a kindergarten classroom that young children were capable of, and very 
interested in, exploring issues of religion and spirituality with their classmates. Their 
research has implications for how schools might work with families to engage in 
thoughtful discussion of sensitive topics. Yet, most of the research on young children’s 
development of scientific and religious conceptions exists in the domain of cognitive 
psychology, where an extra step is required to infer implications for classroom practice 
and the conclusions that can be drawn are limited outside the laboratory. Meanwhile, the 
educational research that exists is focused on secondary and higher education and on 
teachers. Research that focuses on how young children make sense of science and 
religion in instructional contexts would address a large and important gap in the 
literature. 
Finally, there is more work to be done in the exploration of how children’s ideas 
about science and religion connect to deeper understanding and engagement at a broader 
level. Ferrari, Lee, and Taylor (2011) argue for the practice of “teaching for wisdom” – 
that is, infusing the curriculum with issues that carry deep and personal significance for 
students. In particular, they advocate for science classrooms in which students “learn to 
be intellectually honest and sophisticated in their thinking about the natural world and the 
human condition, without denying deep existential questions that authentically matter to 
how they personally live their lives” (Ferrari, Lee, & Taylor, 2011, p. 253). Connecting 
science to other issues, they argue – such as policy, ethics, and philosophy – can allow 
for the teaching of a rigorous science curriculum while simultaneously recognizing that 
“some ultimate mysteries remain beyond science” (Ferrari, Lee, & Taylor, 2011, p. 254).  
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Prior research has pointed to the fruitfulness of using science to imbue learners 
with a sense of deeper meaning by emphasizing ideas like interconnectedness and the 
magnitude of time and space. Two powerful examples are the “Overview Effect” (White, 
1998), a cognitive shift experienced by astronauts and cosmonauts who come to 
experience themselves and the world differently after viewing the Earth from space, and 
the “Science for Monks” program (Impey, 2014), in which His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
convened a group of Western scientists to introduce science to a class of Tibetan monks. 
In each of these cases, both experts and novices underwent a much more meaningful 
learning experience than they would have if the scientific principles without 
acknowledgement of their existential implications. It is intriguing to consider what would 
unfold if these same sorts of ideas were widely shared with young children. The research 
suggests that they are ready to learn.  
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